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Abstract
In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash
equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the
continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known. However, when the equilibria need not
be unique, there may exist discontinuities in the equilibrium mapping. The focus of this work
is to summarize continuity properties for parameterized Nash equilibria and prove continuity
via the approximate Nash game with uniformly continuous objective functions over potentially
non-compact strategy spaces.
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1 Introduction
Mathematical and economic games are, traditionally, defined with fixed parameters. However, in
reality these parameters are often calibrated from data, e.g., for risk aversion for the players of the
game. This naturally introduces estimation errors in the best response function and, thus, also
the Nash equilibria. In this work, we consider the convergence of the set of Nash equilibria as
parameters limit to the “true” values.
The results determined herein are directly motivated by mean field games. Such problems
present a setting with a finite number of players, but with non-compact strategy spaces. As far
as the author is aware, no results on essential equilibria and robustness of Nash equilibria have
previously been general enough to consider such games. The results of this work would, equally,
be applicable for a differential game as the limit of discrete time dynamic games as the time step
tends to 0. In this work we are focused on the set of Nash equilibria themselves rather than the
value of the game as is considered in, e.g., [9].
By the nature of games, this problem is intimately related to the question of continuity of
fixed points. That question has been studied in the literature before. For single-valued mappings
aStevens Institute of Technology, School of Business, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA, zfeinste@stevens.edu.
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lim inf
n→∞ h(xn) ⊆ lim supn→∞ h(xn) ⊆ h(x) = lim~ǫց0 lim supn→∞ h
~ǫ(xn) = lim
~ǫց0
lim inf
n→∞ h
~ǫ(xn)
Figure 1.1: Ordering for the convergence of fixed points and approximate fixed points with xn → x.
we refer to, e.g., [3, 12, 19, 20, 24], for set-valued or multivalued mappings we refer to, e.g.,
[22, 23, 21, 18, 31, 7, 27]. Some of these results are summarized in Appendix C.
This work studies problems in the vein of essential equilibria, which are those Nash equilibria
which are robust to perturbations. This concept was introduced in [33] and has been extended
in, e.g., [34, 4]. In this work, we similarly consider the robustness of the set of equilibria to
perturbations in some parameter of the game. Herein we extend these notions of robustness for
non-compact spaces, which is vital for studying, e.g., mean field games.
The primary innovation of this work is summarized in Figure 1.1. The notation and details
for this summary are provided in Section 3. Briefly, consider a Nash game conditional on some
parameter, e.g., the risk aversion for every player. Let h(·) denote the set of parameterized, pure
or mixed, Nash equilibria (in a, potentially, non-compact metric space) and h~ǫ(·) denote the set
of approximate Nash equilibria for the same game. Figure 1.1 provides relations between these
equilibria as the parameters converge. Notably, and as highlighted throughout this work, the full
set of Nash equilibria is captured by convergence of the approximate equilibria rather than the
set of equilibria themselves. This result is provided in Theorem 3.15. This has implications for
data dependence since consideration of the Nash equilibria themselves can result in an under-
accounting of the true equilibria. This is highlighted for a mean field game in [25]. Throughout
this work we consider the setting in which there are a multiplicity of equilibria. In the case of
unique parameterized equilibria over compact spaces, continuity of the Nash equilibria is a fairly
standard result.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple two player game
that conceptually demonstrates the major results of this work. Properly motivated, we present
the main results of this work in Section 3. For completeness, continuity arguments for the set of
Nash equilibria are presented in Section 3.2. The main results of this work are then presented in
Section 3.3; it is in this section that we demonstrate how to utilize the approximate Nash equilibria
to find the appropriate continuity and convergence notions. Background material on set-valued
continuity are presented in the Appendix A. Theoretical results on the continuity of the value and
best response functions for a game are summarized in Appendix B. Considerations on the continuity
of fixed point problems are summarized in Appendix C.
2 Motivating example
Before considering the main results of this work in Section 3, we wish to provide a simple motivating
example for the continuity and convergence arguments undertaken in this work. Specifically, to
consider a simple setup, we introduce a parameterized two player game in a compact space. In
2
this example we use some terminology of Nash games, for descriptions of these terms we refer the
reader to Section 3.1 below.
Consider a simple two player game constructed to provide many of the fundamental insights
seen in Section 3.2. For this problem we consider a compact parameter space X := [0, 2] over which
we want to consider the continuity of our Nash equilibria. The strategy space for both players are
the compact spaces Y1 = Y2 := [0, 1] and both players are seeking to maximize strictly concave
quadratic objective functions. Let H : [0, 2]× [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 denote the best response function for
this game; specifically we define this game by:
H1(x, y) := argmax
y∗
1
∈[0,1]
{−y∗1(y∗1 − 2xy2)} = min(xy2, 1)
H2(x, y) := argmin
y∗
2
∈[0,1]
{−y∗2(y∗2 − 2y1)} = y1.
By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists some Nash equilibrium for every x ∈ [0, 2], though
it need not be unique. In fact, for any x ∈ [0, 2], we define the set of Nash equilibria (i.e., the fixed
points) by the mapping:
h(x) := FIX
y∈[0,1]2
H(x, y) =


{(0, 0)} if x < 1
{y ∈ [0, 1]2 | y1 = y2} if x = 1
{(0, 0) , (1, 1)} if x > 1.
By the closed graph theorem (see, e.g., Theorem A.6) this fixed point mapping is upper continuous.
However, it is not lower continuous at x = 1. This can be demonstrated by setting x = 1 and
y ∈ (0, 1)2 such that y1 = y2; for any {xn}n∈N ⊆ [0, 2]\{1} → 1 and any {yn}n∈N ⊆ [0, 1]2 → y
there exists N ≥ 0 such that yn 6∈ h(xn) for every n ≥ N .
Intuitively, this provides the main interpretations of upper and lower continuity, i.e.,
• no point in an upper continuous set-valued mapping “disappears” except as the limit of a net
and
• no point in a lower continuous set-valued mapping “appears” except as the limit of other
values.
Notably, these continuity arguments coincide for single-valued functions. For more details we
refer to Appendix A and the references cited therein. In fact, as discussed in Appendix C, we
often find that fixed point mappings are upper, but not lower, continuous. Thus, as presented in
Proposition A.8, there may be fixed points that are not limits of fixed points as seen in this simple
example.
Before presenting the main theoretical results, we wish to give a quick hint as to the main
results of this work. If instead of considering the original game and associated fixed point problem
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y = H(x, y), we introduce an approximating game for ǫ ∈ (0, 14):
Hǫ1(x, y) := {y∗1 ∈ [0, 1] | − y∗1(y∗1 − 2xy2) > v1(x, y)− ǫ}
=
(
xy2 −
√
max{0, xy2 − 1}2 + ǫ , xy2 +
√
ǫ
)
∩ [0, 1]
Hǫ2(x, y) := {y∗2 ∈ [0, 1] | − y∗2(y∗2 − 2y1) > v2(x, y)− ǫ}
=
(
y1 −
√
ǫ , y1 +
√
ǫ
) ∩ [0, 1]
where v1(x, y) = −min{xy2, 1}2 + 2xy2min{xy2, 1} and v2(x, y) = y21 are the optimal values for
the payoff of player 1 and 2 respectively given the parameter x and the strategy of the other
player. With this fixed approximation error ǫ, and with the convention that 1/0 = ∞, the set of
approximating Nash equilibria hǫ(x) := FIXy∈[0,1]2 Hǫ(x, y) are provided by:
hǫ(x) =


A(x) if x ≤ 1
A(x) ∪B1(x) if x ∈ (1, 1+ǫ(1−√ǫ)2 )
A(x) ∪B2(x) ∪ C(x) if x ≥ 1+ǫ(1−√ǫ)2 ,
A(x) =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]2 | y1 ∈ (max{1, x}y2 −
√
ǫ,min{1, x}y2 +
√
ǫ), y2 ∈ [0, 2|1− x|
√
ǫ)
}
,
B1(x) =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]2 | y1 ∈ (xy2 −
√
(xy2 − 1)2 + ǫ, y2 +
√
ǫ), y2 ∈ ( 1
x
, 1]
}
,
B2(x) =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]2
∣∣∣∣∣ y1 ∈ (xy2 −
√
(xy2 − 1)2 + ǫ, y2 +
√
ǫ),
y2 ∈ ( 1x ,
(1−√ǫ)x+√ǫ−
√
[(1−√ǫ)x+√ǫ]2−[2x−1]
2x−1 )
}
,
C(x) =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]2
∣∣∣∣∣ y1 ∈ (xy2 −
√
(xy2 − 1)2 + ǫ, y2 +
√
ǫ),
y2 ∈ ( (1−
√
ǫ)x+
√
ǫ+
√
[(1−√ǫ)x+√ǫ]2−[2x−1]
2x−1 , 1]
}
.
We wish to note that B1(x) = ∅ for x = 1, B1(x) = B2(x) ∪ C(x) ∪ {(1+
√
ǫ+ǫ+ǫ
√
ǫ
(1+
√
ǫ)2
, 1−ǫ
(1+
√
ǫ)2
)} for
x = 1+ǫ
(1−√ǫ)2 , and B2(x) = ∅ for x ≥ 11−2√ǫ .
By construction, h(x) = limǫց0 hǫ(x) for any x ∈ [0, 2]. Additionally, and providing an appli-
cation of Theorem 3.15, h(x) = limǫց0 lim infn→∞ hǫ(xn) for any sequence {xn}n∈N ⊆ [0, 2] → x.
Thus we can consider sensitivity analysis on the approximating fixed points hǫ in order to study
the set of fixed points h. This is in contrast to how such objects are typically studied and motivates
the consideration of approximations taken within this work more generally.
3 Continuity of the set of Nash equilibria
This section provides all the main results of this work. This is summarized in Figure 1.1 for games
where the set of parameterized Nash equilibria is given by h(·). The notation used in the summary
Figure 1.1 is provided in Section 3.1 with the details provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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3.1 Setting and notation
Consider a game whose set of players is indexed by I. For simplicity, throughout this work we
will consider a finite player game |I| < ∞ or one that can be modeled in such a way (e.g., a
mean field game). Let Yi, the strategy space (either of pure or mixed strategies) for player i ∈ I,
be a metric space with metric di. Define Y :=
∏
i∈I Yi to be the product space with metric
d(y1, y2) :=
∑
i∈I di(y
1
i , y
2
i ). Denote the power set of Y by P(Y) := {Y ⊆ Y} (respectively P(Yi) of
Yi). Throughout this work, we often want to fix the strategy of all players but i. Notationally we
define such a strategy by y−i ∈
∏
j∈I\{i} Yj =: Y−i, and (with slight abuse of notation) y = (yi, y−i).
As we wish to consider a parameterized Nash game, we introduce the parameter space X to be a
metric space.
Consider a parameterized Nash game in which player i ∈ I has continuous utility function fi :
X×Y→ R and continuous strategy space Fi : X×Y−i → Pf (Yi) := {Yi ⊆ Yi | Yi = cl (Yi), Y 6= ∅}.
Definition 3.1. Given a parameterized Nash game, a Nash equilibrium y∗ ∈ Y at x ∈ X if, for
every i ∈ I, y∗i ∈ Fi(x, y∗−i) and
fi(x, y
∗) ≥ fi(x, yi, y∗−i) ∀yi ∈ Y : yi ∈ Fi(x, y∗−i).
Oftentimes the Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the best response function rather than
the definition given above.
Definition 3.2. Given a parameterized Nash game, the best response function for player i ∈ I
is defined as Hi : X× Y→ P(Yi) with
Hi(x, y) := argmax
y∗i ∈Yi
{fi(x, y∗i , y−i) | y∗i ∈ Fi(x, y−i)} . (3.1)
Note that a best response function, Hi, may be empty for some choices of (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
With this function we are able to determine the set of all Nash equilibria as a fixed point problem.
Consider the product function H :=
∏
i∈I Hi of the best response functions for our Nash game.
Definition 3.3. Given a parameterized Nash game and best response function H :=
∏
i∈I Hi, the
parameterized set of Nash equilibria is the mapping h : X→ P(Y) such that
h(x) := FIX
y∈Y
H(x, y) := {y ∈ Y | y ∈ H(x, y)}. (3.2)
It is this mapping h : X → P(Y) of Nash equilibria which we wish to investigate within this
work. Throughout the remainder of this work we will utilize the notation and definitions provided
in this section.
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3.2 Equilibria of Nash games
In this section we study the best response function H and set of Nash equilibria h to determine
continuity and sensitivity arguments for the set of Nash equilibria. In particular, as shown in
the motivating example of Section 2, we find that the set of Nash equilibria are typically not
continuous and therefore the results highlighted by that example hold more generally. These results
are generally well-known and included for completeness. To ease the readability of this work, we
first review the assumptions from Section 3.1 which will hold throughout the rest of this work.
Assumption 3.4. Consider a finite player game with players indexed by I. The strategy space of
player i ∈ I is given by the metric space Yi. Additionally, the game is parameterized by the metric
space X. Each player i ∈ I has continuous utility function fi : X × Y→ R and continuous feasible
strategy space Fi : X× Y−i → Pf (Yi).
Proposition 3.5. Consider the generalized Nash game described in Section 3.1, graphH ⊆ X ×
Y× Y and graphh ⊆ X× Y are closed in their respective product topologies.
Proof. First, we note by Theorem B.2 that graphHi is closed for every player i ∈ I. Second, we
determine that
graphH = {(x, y, y∗) ∈ X×Y× Y | y∗i ∈ Hi(x, y) ∀i ∈ I} =
⋂
i∈I
[graphHi × Y−i]
is closed as it is the intersection of closed sets. Finally, by Lemma C.1(i), graphh is closed as
well.
Utilizing the above result on the closedness of the graph of parameterized Nash equilibria h, we
can consider the convergence of equilibria.
Corollary 3.6. Let (xn)n∈N → x be a convergent sequence of parameters in the domain of h, i.e.,
so that h(xn), h(x) 6= ∅ for every n ∈ N. Then h(x) ⊇ lim supn→∞ h(xn).
Proof. This follows directly from Propositions 3.5 and A.8.
Remark 3.7. Throughout this work we have assumed a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. However, if
card[h(·)] = 1 and Y is a compact space, then h(x) = limn→∞ h(xn) for any sequence (xn)n∈N → x.
To prove continuity of h, we use the closed graph theorem (see, e.g., [1, Theorem 2.58]).
Remark 3.8. While we assumed throughout this section that X and Y are metric spaces, these
are stronger conditions than necessary for the results provided so far. Proposition 3.5 only requires
that X,Y be Hausdorff spaces and Corollary 3.6 requires additionally that Y is a regular space.
As a consequence, the finite player assumption |I| <∞ can also be dropped for the results of this
section.
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Example 3.9. [25] studies the mean field limit of a sequence of n player games (as n →∞). We
wish to demonstrate how Corollary 3.6 (with generalizations as noted in Remark 3.8) can imme-
diately provide the main result of that paper while referring the reader to [25] for the formalities
and setup.
Consider a game with an infinite number of players indexed by the interval I = [0, 1]. Let B
be the Borel σ-algebra of the player space I. For this example we will parameterize our game by
the measure of player importance on the equilibrium, i.e., consider X := M to be the space of
all probability measures on the measurable space (I,B) absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue
measure λ. Leaving out the formalities of the game, we are interested in the set of Nash equilibria
h(µ) for µ ∈ M; specifically, we are interested in the relation between the n player game and the
mean field limit, i.e., between discrete measures and the Lebesgue measure λ ∈ M. Consider the
sequence of discrete probability measures (λn)n∈N ⊆M defined by
λn(B) :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
I(
k
n
∈ B) ∀B ∈ B.
Utilizing the metric dM(µ1, µ2) := supa,b∈I
a≤b
|µ1([a, b])− µ2([a, b])| on M, limn→∞ dM(λn, λ) = 0 by
definition. A key result of [25], whose inclusion follows from Corollary 3.6, is
{
lim
n→∞ ρn | ρn ∈ h(λn) ∀n ∈ N
}
=: lim inf
n→∞ h(λn) ( h(λ).
3.3 Approximate Nash equilibria
Consider now a game such that {(x, y−i) 7→ fi(x, y∗i , y−i)}y∗i ∈Yi is uniformly equicontinuous. Define
f ǫi : X × Y → [−1ǫ , 1ǫ ] with f ǫi (x, y) := −1ǫ ∨ fi(x, y) ∧ 1ǫ for any ǫ > 0. Further, construct
vǫi : X× Y→ [−1ǫ , 1ǫ ] for any ǫ > 0 by
vǫi (x, y) := sup
y∗i ∈Yi
{f ǫi (x, y∗i , y−i) | y∗i ∈ Fi(x, y−i)} (3.3)
to be the value that player i receives from this ǫ-bounded game.
The following assumption is stated for ease of reference. These properties are assumed for the
entirety of this section.
Assumption 3.10. Consider a game following Assumption 3.4. Additionally assume that {(x, y−i) 7→
fi(x, y
∗
i , y−i)}y∗i ∈Yi is uniformly equicontinuous, i.e., fi is uniformly continuous in X × Y−i uni-
formly in Yi.
Remark 3.11. If fi is uniformly continuous then the collection {(x, y−i) 7→ fi(x, y∗i , y−i)}y∗i ∈Yi is
uniformly equicontinuous. In particular, if X and Yj are compact spaces for every player j ∈ I (as
is assumed in, e.g., [4, 26] or the motivating example of Section 2) then this holds following from
Assumption 3.4.
Corollary 3.12. Fix ǫ > 0, then vǫi (defined in (3.3)) is continuous for every player i ∈ I.
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Proof. This follows from an application of Theorem B.3.
Consider now the approximate Nash games defined by the~ǫ-best response functionsH~ǫi : X×Y→
Yi satisfying
H~ǫi (x, y) := {y∗i ∈ Yi | f ǫ2i (x, y∗i , y−i) > vǫ2i (x, y)− ǫ1, y∗i ∈ Bi,ǫ3 [Fi(x, y−i)]} (3.4)
for any ~ǫ ∈ R3++ where Bi,ǫ[Yi] := {yi ∈ Yi | inf y¯i∈Yi di(yi, y¯i) < ǫ} is the (open) ball of size
ǫ surrounding Yi ⊆ Yi. With these approximate best responses, we introduce the associated
approximate Nash equilibria
h~ǫ(x) := FIX
y∈Y
H~ǫ(x, y) = {y ∈ Y | y ∈ H~ǫ(x, y)} (3.5)
for every x ∈ X.
Remark 3.13. If Yi are compact spaces for every i ∈ I then ǫ2 is no longer required in (3.4) or
(3.5). If Fi ≡ Yi for every player i ∈ I then neither ǫ2 nor ǫ3 are required for the results of this
work.
With these approximate Nash games, we wish to consider a modification to the original game,
i.e.,
h∗(x) := lim
~ǫց0
h~ǫ(x) ∀x ∈ X. (3.6)
This set-theoretic limit exists due to the monotonicity of ~ǫ ∈ R3++ 7→ h~ǫ(x) for a fixed parameter
x ∈ X. In particular, we can characterize this limit by the intersection over approximation errors
~ǫ, i.e., h∗(x) :=
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
h~ǫ(x) for any x ∈ X. The below proposition is used to demonstrate that
this set of approximating equilibria are, indeed, equal to the original Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3.14. Consider a parameterized Nash game and its approximations. For any x ∈ X
the set of Nash equilibria is equivalent to the modified Nash equilibria introduced in (3.6), i.e.,
h = h∗.
Proof. First, h(x) ⊆ h∗(x) for any x ∈ X trivially by construction since h(x) ⊆ h~ǫ(x) for every
x ∈ X and every ~ǫ ∈ R3++. Now consider y∗ ∈ h∗(x). That is, fi(x, y∗) > vǫ2i (x, y∗) − ǫ1 and
y∗i ∈ Bi,ǫ3 [Fi(x, y∗−i)] for every i ∈ I and every ~ǫ ∈ R3++. First, this implies that y∗i ∈ Fi(x, y∗−i)
(for every player i ∈ I) since inf y¯i∈Fi(x,y∗−i) di(y∗i , y¯i) < ǫ3 for every ǫ3 > 0. Therefore to prove that
y∗ ∈ h(x), it is sufficient to show that
fi(x, y
∗) = vi(x, y∗) := sup
yi∈Yi
{
fi(x, yi, y
∗
−i) | yi ∈ Fi(x, y∗−i)
}
for every player i ∈ I. To complete this proof we consider 2 cases:
(i) First, assume vi(x, y
∗) ∈ R for every player i ∈ I. Let ǫ2 < 1maxi∈I |vi(x,y∗)| (with 1/0 =
+∞), then f ǫ2i (x, y∗) = fi(x, y∗) and vǫ2i (x, y∗) = vi(x, y∗) for every player i ∈ I since
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fi(x, y
∗) ≤ vi(x, y∗) by definition. Thus, by construction of y∗ ∈ h∗(x), it follows that
fi(x, y
∗) > vi(x, y∗)− ǫ1 for every ǫ1 > 0 and every player i ∈ I. As such, fi(x, y∗) ≥ vi(x, y∗)
and, as previously mentioned, fi(x, y
∗) ≤ vi(x, y∗) by definition.
(ii) Second, assume there exists some player j ∈ I such that vj(x, y∗) = +∞. By construction,
this implies implies h(x) = ∅, thus we wish to show a contradiction to y∗ ∈ h∗(x). Fix some
j ∈ I such that vj(x, y∗) = +∞. Consider ǫ2 < 1|fj(x,y∗)| so that f
ǫ2
j (x, y
∗) = fj(x, y∗) and
vǫ2j (x, y
∗) = 1
ǫ2
> fj(x, y
∗). Consider also ǫ1 < 1ǫ2 − fj(x, y∗). Then, by construction of ~ǫ,
y∗j 6∈ H~ǫj(x, y∗) contradicting the assumption that y∗ ∈ h~ǫ(x) providing the contradiction.
This brings us, now, to the main result of this work. Namely, that we can characterize the set
of all Nash equilibria under approximations of the game and approximations of the parameter. For
ease of reference, the assumptions utilized in the below theorem are summarized in Assumptions 3.4
and 3.10.
Theorem 3.15. Let (xn)n∈N → x be a convergent sequence of parameters in the domain of h, i.e.,
so that h(xn), h(x) 6= ∅ for every n ∈ N. Then
h(x) = lim
~ǫց0
lim inf
n→∞ h
~ǫ(xn) = lim
~ǫց0
lim sup
n→∞
h~ǫ(xn).
Proof. First, we wish to note that, for every player i ∈ I, (x, y∗) 7→ inf y¯i∈Fi(x,y∗−i)[di(y∗i , y¯i) ∧ (2ǫ3)]
is continuous by an application of Theorem B.3 since the modified metric objective is appropriately
equicontinuous as a collection over y¯.
For fixed approximation level ~ǫ ∈ R3++, H~ǫ and h~ǫ have open graphs in their respective topolo-
gies. Consider the graph of H~ǫ:
graphH~ǫ =
{
(x, y, y∗) ∈ X×Y× Y
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ I : f
ǫ2
i (x, y
∗
i , y−i) > v
ǫ2
i (x, y)− ǫ1,
y∗i ∈ Bi,ǫ3[Fi(x, y−i)]
}
=
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | f ǫ2i (x, y∗i , y−i) > vǫ2i (x, y) − ǫ1}∩
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | inf
y¯i∈Fi(x,y−i)
di(y
∗
i , y¯i) < ǫ3}
=
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | ǫ1 > vǫ2i (x, y)− f ǫ2i (x, y∗i , y−i)}∩
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | inf
y¯i∈Fi(x,y−i)
[di(y
∗
i , y¯i) ∧ (2ǫ3)] < ǫ3}
is the finite intersection of open sets by continuity of all involved functions. Finally, h~ǫ inherits this
property from H~ǫ as provided in Lemma C.3(i).
In order to complete this proof, let us introduce a second (closed) ~ǫ-approximate best response
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function H¯~ǫi : X× Y→ Yi satisfying
H¯~ǫi (x, y) := {y∗i ∈ Yi | f ǫ2i (x, y∗i , y−i) ≥ vǫ2i (x, y)− ǫ1, y∗i ∈ clBi,ǫ3 [Fi(x, y−i)]}
for any ~ǫ ∈ R3++. As before, with these approximate best responses, we introduce the associated
approximate Nash equilibria
h¯~ǫ(x) := {y∗ ∈ Y | y∗ ∈ H¯~ǫ(x, y∗)} (3.7)
for every x ∈ X. Note that, by construction, h(x) ⊆ h~ǫ(x) ⊆ h¯~ǫ(x) ⊆ h2×~ǫ(x) for any x ∈ X and
any approximation error ~ǫ ∈ R3++.
Now, for fixed approximation level ~ǫ ∈ R3++, H¯~ǫ and h¯~ǫ have closed graphs in their respective
topologies. Consider the graph of H¯~ǫ:
graph H¯~ǫ =
{
(x, y, y∗) ∈ X×Y× Y
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ I : f
ǫ2
i (x, y
∗
i , y−i) ≥ vǫ2i (x, y)− ǫ1,
y∗i ∈ clBi,ǫ3 [Fi(x, y−i)]
}
=
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | f ǫ2i (x, y∗i , y−i) ≥ vǫ2i (x, y) − ǫ1}∩
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | inf
y¯i∈Fi(x,y−i)
di(y
∗
i , y¯i) ≤ ǫ3}
=
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | ǫ1 ≥ vǫ2i (x, y)− f ǫ2i (x, y∗i , y−i)}∩
⋂
i∈I
{(x, y, y∗) ∈ X× Y× Y | inf
y¯i∈Fi(x,y−i)
[di(y
∗
i , y¯i) ∧ (2ǫ3)] ≤ ǫ3}
is the intersection of closed sets by continuity of all involved functions. Finally, h¯~ǫ inherits this
property from H¯~ǫ as provided in Lemma C.1(i).
Therefore by construction of the set-theoretic limit and Propositions 3.14, A.8, and A.9,
h(x) =
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
h~ǫ(x) ⊆
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
lim inf
n→∞ h
~ǫ(xn) ⊆
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
lim sup
n→∞
h~ǫ(xn)
⊆
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
lim sup
n→∞
h¯~ǫ(xn) ⊆
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
h¯~ǫ(x) ⊆
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
h2×~ǫ(x) =
⋂
~ǫ∈R3
++
h~ǫ(x) = h(x).
Remark 3.16. A small modification of the proof of Theorem 3.15 provides the alternative limiting
result with respect to the closed approximate Nash equilibria h¯~ǫ (defined in (3.7)), i.e.,
h(x) = lim
~ǫց0
lim inf
n→∞ h¯
~ǫ(xn) = lim
~ǫց0
lim sup
n→∞
h¯~ǫ(xn)
for (xn)n∈N → x in the domain of h.
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4 Conclusion
In this work we have constructed order relations for the set of all Nash equilibria. In particular,
we found that, for very general set of games, the limit of parameterized Nash equilibria are only a
subset of all true equilibria. We then find certain sufficient conditions so that the true equilibria can
be found as the limit of approximate parameterized Nash equilibria. As such, we argue that more
focus should be on the approximate Nash equilibria proposed in this work due to this convergence
analysis and the inherent nature of the estimation of game parameters. Notably, none of the results
in this work rely on uniqueness or the compactness of the strategy spaces. As such, these results
are applicable for, e.g., mean field games.
As introduced in Example 3.9 and discussed more thoroughly in [25], the mean field limit can
result in more equilibria than those that are the limit of n player games (as n → ∞). However,
given a mean field game, Theorem 3.15 is not strong enough to determine a robust approximate n
player game for the desired mean field game. We leave this as an important extension to consider
in future works.
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A Set-Valued Continuity
In this section we will present definitions of continuity for set-valued or multivalued mappings, i.e.,
functions mapping into the power set of some space. We will additionally provide a brief overview
of some results on these forms of continuity from the literature. Throughout this section we will
let X and Y be Hausdorff spaces.
Definition A.1. A set-valued mapping F : X → P(Y) is called (upper, lower) continuous if it is
continuous with respect to the (resp. upper, lower) Vietoris topology.
Remark A.2. The mapping F : X → P(Y) is continuous if, and only if, it is upper and lower
continuous. If F is single-valued, i.e., F (x) = {f(x)} for some function f : X→ Y, then F is upper
continuous if, and only if, F is lower continuous if, and only if, f is continuous.
Remark A.3. Upper (lower) continuity is often referred to as upper (resp. lower) hemicontinuity
(in, e.g., [1]), upper (resp. lower) semicontinuity (in, e.g., [2, 15, 16, 28]), and inner (resp. outer)
continuity (in, e.g., [29]) in the literature. We use the terminology from [17, 13, 14] to emphasize
that a single-valued function is upper continuous if, and only if, it is lower continuous if, and only if,
it is continuous. This has the additional advantage of avoiding the need to distinguish single-valued
semicontinuity from set-valued continuity concepts.
The following equivalent representations for upper and lower continuity are standard in the
literature (see [15, Propositions 1.2.6 and 1.2.7] and [1, Lemmas 17.4 and 17.5]).
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Proposition A.4. For a set-valued mapping F : X→ P(Y) the following are equivalent:
(i) F is upper continuous;
(ii) F+[V ] := {x ∈ X | F (x) ⊆ V } is open in X for any V ⊆ Y open;
(iii) F−[V¯ ] := {x ∈ X | F (x) ∩ V¯ 6= ∅} is closed in X for any V¯ ⊆ Y closed.
Proposition A.5. For a set-valued mapping F : X→ P(Y) the following are equivalent:
(i) F is lower continuous;
(ii) F−[V ] := {x ∈ X | F (x) ∩ V 6= ∅} is open in X for any V ⊆ Y open;
(iii) F+[V¯ ] := {x ∈ X | F (x) ⊆ V¯ } is closed in X for any V¯ ⊆ Y closed.
We additionally wish to provide simple conditions for upper and lower continuity via the graphs
of our multivalued functions.
Theorem A.6. Let Y be a regular topological space. Consider the set-valued mapping F : X →
Pˆf (Y) := {Y ∈ P(Y) | Y = cl (Y )}.
(i) F has a closed graph, i.e.,
graphF := {(x, y) ∈ X× Y | y ∈ F (x)} is closed in X× Y,
if F is upper continuous;
(ii) F is upper continuous if Y is a compact space and F has a closed graph.
Proof. This follows from [15, Proposition 2.17] and [1, Theorem 17.11].
Lemma A.7. [1, Lemma 17.12] For set-valued mappings F : X → P(Y) we have that F is lower
continuous if F has open fibers, i.e.,
F−({y}) := {x ∈ X | y ∈ F (x)}
is open for any y ∈ Y. And F has open fibers if the graph of F is open in the product topology.
We conclude this section by providing comparison of continuity results with Kuratowski limits.
Proposition A.8. [15, Proposition 2.13] A set-valued mapping F : X→ P(Y) has a closed graph
if, and only if,
F (x) ⊇ lim sup
i∈I
F (xi) :=
⋂
i∈I
cl
⋃
j≥i
F (xj)
for every net (xi)i∈I → x in the domain of F .
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Proposition A.9. If a set-valued mapping F : X→ P(Y) is lower continuous then
F (x) ⊆ lim inf
i∈I
F (xi) := {y ∈ Y | ∀V ∈ N (y) ∃i ∈ I : F (xj) ∩ V 6= ∅ ∀j ≥ i}
for every net (xi)i∈I → x in the domain of F where N (y) is the set of neighborhoods of y ∈ Y.
Proof. Let y ∈ F (x) and take some neighborhood V ∈ N (y). By lower continuity it follows that
F−[V ] is a neighborhood of x. Therefore, there exists some i ∈ I such that xj ∈ F−[V ] for every
j ≥ i.
B Continuity of the value function and best response function
In this section we will present continuity results for parameterized optimization problems. From
the literature we can derive results on the value function (and in the case of the Berge maximum
theorem, the optimizers) of such an optimization problem. Throughout this section we will let X
and Y be Hausdorff spaces except where otherwise indicated.
Theorem B.1. Let f : X × Y → R be some desired objective function and F : X → P(Y). Let
v : X→ R ∪ {±∞} be defined by
v(x) := sup{f(x, y) | y ∈ F (x)} (B.1)
for any x ∈ X.
(i) The value function v is upper semicontinuous if f is upper semicontinuous and F is upper
continuous with nonempty and compact images.
(ii) The value function v is lower semicontinuous if f is lower semicontinuous and F is lower
continuous.
(iii) The value function v is continuous if f is continuous and F is continuous with nonempty and
compact images. Further, the set of maximizers V : X→ P(Y)\{∅}, defined by
V (x) := argmax{f(x, y) | y ∈ F (x)} = {y ∈ F (x) | f(x, y) = v(x)} (B.2)
for every x ∈ X, is upper continuous with compact images.
Proof. These are trivial consequences of [1, Lemmas 17.29 and 17.30] and the Berge maximum
theorem (see, e.g., [1, Theorem 17.31]).
The following theorem provides an extension of Theorem B.1(iii) in that it does not require the
compactness of the space Y. Under compactness of the space Y, these results are equivalent by
application of the closed graph theorem (Theorem A.6).
13
Theorem B.2. Let f : X × Y → R be continuous and F : X → Pf (Y) be continuous. The set of
maximizers V : X→ P(Y), defined by (B.2), has a closed graph in the product topology X×Y.
Proof. First, recall that graphV = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | y ∈ V (x)}. Consider the convergent net
(xi, yi)i∈I ⊆ graphV → (x, y) ∈ X × Y. To prove graphV is closed, we wish to show that (x, y) ∈
graphV . That is, y ∈ F (x) and f(x, y) ≥ f(x, yˆ) for every yˆ ∈ F (x).
(i) By F upper continuous with nonempty and closed values, the closed graph theorem (Theo-
rem A.6) implies graphF is closed. This implies that (x, y) ∈ graphF by (xi, yi) ∈ graphF
for every i ∈ I, i.e., y ∈ F (x).
(ii) Suppose y 6∈ V (x). Then there exists some yˆ ∈ F (x) such that f(x, y) < f(x, yˆ). By the lower
continuity of F , there exists a subnet (xij )j∈J → x and net (yˆj)j∈J → yˆ such that yˆj ∈ F (xij )
for every j ∈ J . By the continuity of the objective function we find:
lim
j∈J
f(xij , yˆj) = f(x, yˆ) > f(x, y) = lim
j∈J
f(xij , yij).
Therefore for sufficiently large j ∈ J it must follow that f(xij , yij ) < f(xij , yˆj) which contra-
dicts the initial assumption that (xij , yij ) ∈ graphV thus completing the proof.
Theorem B.3. Let X be a metric space and let Y be a Tychonoff space. Let f : X×Y→ K ⊆ R for
compact set K be continuous and such that {f(·, y)}y∈Y is uniformly equicontinuous. Additionally,
let F : X → P(Y)\{∅} be continuous. The value function v : X → R ∪ {±∞}, defined by (B.1), is
continuous.
Proof. Define Y¯ to be the Stone-Cˇech compactification of Y with embedding β : Y → Y¯. Let
f¯x : Y¯ → K be the unique continuous extension of f(x, ·) for fixed x ∈ X (see, e.g., [1, Theorem
2.79]). Define f¯ : X × Y¯ → K by f¯(x, y¯) := f¯x(y¯) for any x ∈ X and y¯ ∈ Y¯. By uniform
equicontinuity and β(Y) being a dense subset of Y¯, we will show that f¯ is a continuous mapping.
Take a net (xi, y¯i)i∈I → (x, y¯) in X× Y¯ and net (yji )j∈J such that limj∈J β(yji ) = y¯i for every i ∈ I,
then
lim
i∈I
|f¯(x, y¯)− f¯(xi, y¯i)| = lim
i∈I
|f¯x(y¯)− f¯xi(y¯i)|
≤ lim
i∈I
(|f¯x(y¯)− f¯x(y¯i)|+ |f¯x(y¯i)− f¯xi(y¯i)|)
= lim
i∈I
|f¯x(y¯i)− f¯xi(y¯i)|
= lim
i∈I
lim
j∈J
|f(x, yji )− f(xi, yji )|
= lim
j∈J
lim
i∈I
|f(x, yji )− f(xi, yji )| = 0.
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Define F¯ : X → P(Y¯) by F¯ (x) := cl {β(y) | y ∈ F (x)} with closure taken in Y¯. Trivially, by
construction, F¯ has nonempty and closed (and therefore compact) images. We will now show that
F¯ is continuous. Define G : X → P(Y¯) by G(x) := β[F (x)]. By construction, G−[·] = F−[β−1[·]]
where β−1(y¯) = ∅ if y¯ ∈ Y¯\β[Y]. By continuity of F and β, it is trivial to see that G must also be
continuous. Because F¯ (x) = clG(x) it is continuous since the closure of a lower continuous function
is lower continuous ([15, Proposition 2.38]) and the closure of an upper continuous function mapping
into a normal range space (true of Y¯ as it is a compact Hausdorff space) is upper continuous ([15,
Proposition 2.40]). Finally, we wish to utilize Theorem B.1(iii) in order to prove the result. Using
this result we note that v¯ : X→ K, defined by
v¯(x) := sup{f¯(x, y¯) | y¯ ∈ F¯ (x)},
is continuous. And by property of the supremum, and that f¯ is an extension of f , we conclude
v¯(x) = sup{f¯(x, y¯) | y¯ ∈ F¯ (x)}
= sup{f¯(x, y¯) | y¯ ∈ G(x)}
= sup{f¯(x, β(y)) | y ∈ F (x)}
= sup{f(x, y) | y ∈ F (x)} = v(x).
C Continuity of parameterized fixed points
In this section we will provide continuity results and simple sensitivity analysis for the collection of
fixed points for set-valued mappings. These results follow from the definitions of continuity given
in the prior section for the set-valued mapping. Throughout this section we will let X and Y be
Hausdorff spaces except where otherwise indicated. Additionally throughout, consider the fixed
points of the mapping H : X× Y→ P(Y). We will denote the parameterized fixed points of H by
the function h : X→ P(Y), i.e.,
h(x) := FIX
y∈Y
H(x, y) = {y ∈ Y | y ∈ H(x, y)} ∀x ∈ X.
The results in this section are generally trivial and highly related to the literature on data
dependence of fixed points in, e.g., [22, 18, 30, 27]. Though not the main focus of this work, the
continuity results presented in this section are widely applicable in, e.g., convergence of PageR-
ank [11] with respect to the underlying network topology or data dependence of financial systemic
risk models such as those in [6, 5, 32, 8] where methodology to estimate system parameters are
studied in, e.g., [10].
Lemma C.1. (i) If graphH ⊆ X×Y×Y is closed in the product topology then graphh ⊆ X×Y
is closed in the product topology.
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(ii) If the properties of (i) are satisfied and Y is a compact Hausdorff space then h is an upper
continuous multivalued map with closed and compact images.
Proof. (i) Recall that the graph of h is given by
graphh := {(x, y) ∈ X×Y | y ∈ h(x)}.
Let {(xi, yi)}i∈I ⊆ X×Y→ (x, y) such that (xi, yi) ∈ graphh for every i ∈ I. By definition of
the mapping h it is immediate that (xi, yi, yi) ∈ graphH for every i ∈ I. By convergence in
the product topology and closedness of the graph ofH it immediately follows that y ∈ H(x, y),
i.e., y ∈ h(x).
(ii) If we additionally assume that Y is compact then we can apply the closed graph theorem
(Theorem A.6) to recover that h is upper continuous and closed-valued. Since a closed subset
of a compact set is compact, we recover that h is additionally compact-valued.
Remark C.2. If the properties of Lemma C.1(ii) are satisfied, Y is a locally convex space that is
convex, and H has nonempty convex images then h has nonempty images by the Kakutani fixed
point theorem (see, e.g., [1, Corollary 17.55])
Lemma C.3. (i) If graphH ⊆ X×Y×Y is open in the product topology then graphh ⊆ X×Y
is open in the product topology.
(ii) If H has open fibers (i.e., H−({y¯}) := {(x, y) ∈ X×Y | y¯ ∈ H(x, y)} is open for every y¯ ∈ Y)
then h has open fibers.
Proof. (i) Let {(xi, yi)}i∈I ⊆ X × Y → (x, y) such that (xi, yi) 6∈ graphh for every i ∈ I. By
definition of the mapping h it is immediate that (xi, yi, yi) 6∈ graphH for every i ∈ I. By
convergence in the product topology and openness of the graph of H it immediately follows
that y 6∈ H(x, y), i.e., y 6∈ h(x).
(ii) Fix y¯ ∈ Y. Let {xi}i∈I ⊆ X → x such that xi 6∈ h−({y¯}) for every i ∈ I. By definition of
the mapping h it is immediate that (xi, y¯) 6∈ H−({y¯}) for every i ∈ I. By convergence in the
product topology and openness of the fibers ofH it immediately follows that (x, y¯) 6∈ H−({y¯}),
i.e., y¯ 6∈ h(x).
Remark C.4. The condition of Lemma C.3(i) and (ii) imply h is lower continuous, in fact the
condition of Lemma C.3(i) implies (ii) (see, e.g., Lemma A.7).
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